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In Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law, and Financial
Engineering Are Redefining Economic Statecraft, Professor Chris Brummer
embraces the complexity of the global economic system and its regulation by
exploring the emerging role and dominance of varying strands of economic
collaboration and regulation that he collectively refers to as
“minilateralism.” In describing the turn toward minilateralism, Brummer
notes a number of key features of this new minilateral system, including a
shift away from global cooperation to strategic alliances composed of the
smallest group necessary to achieve a particular goal, a turn from formal
treaties to informal non-binding accords and other soft law, and the
willingness of governments to resort to financial engineering to achieve their
goals. While doing so, Brummer’s book explores how and why this shift from
multilateralism to minilateralism has occurred, and he discusses the issues
associated with managing and shaping the healthy growth and development
of this system. He advocates that policymakers and regulators use what he
terms “smart minilateralism” to define policy objectives, choose the proper
minilateral tools, and legitimize their actions by seeking the support of
relevant stakeholders.
This Review engages Brummer’s theories, complicates them, and in a
variety of instances challenges them. It explores whether the world is merely
experiencing the fine tuning of multilateralism, rather than a shift to
minilateralism; whether minilateralism is simply better documented today
than it has been in the past, rather than the emerging norm; and whether
minilateralism is really a new phenomenon. It also challenges Brummer to
offer his readers more on how multilateral and minilateral systems interact,
how minilateral legitimacy might be achieved, and what role non-
governmental entities do and should play in international economic
regulation. In addition, this Review suggests that in various contexts
minilateralism is doomed to fail and explores the implications of that failure.
Thus, in a style of academic criticism, this Review criticizes the excellent and
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demands an unattainable level of perfection, especially because it would
require Brummer to turn his readable and fully formed text into a multi-
volume treatise.
INTRODUCTION
During the early to mid-1300s, William of Ockham, a Franciscan monk
and medieval philosopher, is credited with formulating and championing a
problem solving rule that has become known as “Ockham’s razor.”1
Ockham’s razor is the principle that when faced with a problem with an
uncertain solution, the simplest answer is the best answer until refuted.2 A
similar sentiment has also been attributed to Albert Einstein, who is credited
with saying, “[e]verything should be made as simple as possible, but not
simpler.”3 Comparably, the obsession of many economists with efficiency
also is likely a tacit endorsement of Ockham’s razor, as complexity often
leads to inefficient results.4
Yet, Ockham’s razor itself is deceptive because it conveys the
appearance of simplicity. This approach to problem solving rests upon at least
two important assumptions. First, Ockham’s razor rests upon the assumption
that the problem can be identified and isolated. Second, Ockham’s razor rests
upon the assumption that the simplest solution can be determined. In the
absence of these assumptions being met, the value of Ockham’s razor as a
problem-solving tool declines dramatically.
International economic regulation confounds Ockham’s razor. This is
because the international economic system entails a wide variety of
subsystems, including global trade, international finance, and the global
monetary system. In addition, the goals sought to be achieved within
international economic regulation can vary widely among regulators.
Examples of these varied goals include achieving greater global efficiency,
creating ties among nations to avoid global conflict, promoting national
interests, and promoting various political and economic ideologies. Also,
figuring out what is a “simple” solution to the task of creating an effective
system of international economic regulation can be extraordinarily difficult.
For example, global government, which might be a simple and effective
solution to global economic issues, raises a host of implemental and
operational difficulties. In short, the word “simple” and its foreign
equivalents likely should not be included in discussions of how the global
1. See JULIAN BAGGINI & PETER S. FOSL, THE PHILOSOPHER’S TOOLKIT § 5.7 (2d ed. 2011)
(providing an overview of Ockham’s razor).
2. Id.
3. THEULTIMATEQUOTABLE EINSTEIN 475 (Alice Calaprice ed., 2011) (noting that although
this quotation is regularly attributed to Einstein, its origins are uncertain).
4. See George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 946 (1992) (“In formulating efficient legal rules, economists usually start
with the simplest model and then add complexities.”).
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economic system should be regulated. Applying Ockham’s razor in the realm
of international economic regulation is difficult, if not impossible, because
of the challenges of identifying and isolating the problems and the difficulties
of determining meaningful solutions. All of this demonstrates the complexity
of international economic regulation makes it an extraordinarily demanding
area of study.
In Minilateralism: How Trade Alliances, Soft Law, and Financial
Engineering Are Redefining Economic Statecraft (Minilateralism), Professor
Chris Brummer embraces the complexity of the global economic system and
its regulation by exploring the emerging role and dominance of varying
strands of economic collaboration and regulation that he collectively refers
to as “minilateralism.”5 In doing so, Brummer contrasts minilateralism with
the “multilateralism” that dominated international economic regulation
during the latter half of last century. Importantly, although Brummer
acknowledges that “multilateralism” can be defined as cooperation among
three or more countries, he defines “multilateralism” as the type of
cooperation in which numerous countries enter formal treaties that
memorialize economic relationships often under the supervision of
international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund or the
World Trade Organization.6 In contrast, according to Brummer,
“minilateralism” refers to more modest, innovative, and less formal emerging
approaches to coordinate activities to regulate the global economy.7
In describing the turn toward minilateralism, Brummer notes a number
of key features of this new minilateral system, including a shift away from
global cooperation to strategic alliances composed of the smallest group
necessary to achieve a particular goal, a turn from formal treaties to informal
nonbinding accords and other soft law, and the willingness of governments
to resort to financial engineering to achieve their goals.8 While doing so,
Brummer’s book explores how and why this shift from multilateralism to
minilateralism has occurred, and he discusses the issues associated with
managing and shaping the healthy growth and development of this
minilateral system. He advocates that policymakers and regulators use what
he terms “smart minilateralism” to define policy objectives, choose the
proper minilateral tools, and obtain legitimacy for their actions by seeking
the support of relevant stakeholders.9
This Book Review engages Brummer’s theories, complicates them, and,
in a variety of instances, challenges them. It explores whether the world is
merely experiencing the fine-tuning of multilateralism, rather than a shift to
5. CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, AND
FINANCIAL ENGINEERINGARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (2014).
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 17–19.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 165.
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minilateralism; whether minilateralism is just better documented today than
in the past, rather than the emerging norm; and whether minilateralism is
really a new phenomenon or a well-established historical occurrence.10 It also
challenges Brummer to offer his readers more on how multilateral and
minilateral systems interact, how minilateral legitimacy might be achieved,
and what role nongovernmental entities do and should play in international
economic regulation.11 Thus, in a style similar to a great deal of academic
criticism, this Review explores the excellent and demands an unattainable
level of perfection because it would require Brummer to turn his readable and
fully formed text into a multi-volume treatise.
The remainder of this Review is structured as follows. Part I provides a
brief overview of Brummer’s text and explores the intricacies of his theories.
Although ultimately agreeing that Brummer’s thesis is correct, Part II pushes
back against Brummer’s claim that minilateralism is a new and innovative
approach to international economic regulation that is becoming the dominant
mode of international diplomacy. Part III explores some of the topics that still
need to be addressed relating to minilateralism now that Brummer has
authored his text. Part IV discusses the reality that, in certain areas of
international economic regulation, minilateralism is doomed to fail and
explores the implication of that failure. Lastly, the Conclusion provides brief
final remarks.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY IN TWO HUNDRED PAGES
Brummer’s sophomore book is anything but sophomoric, which is not
surprising considering the depth and breadth of his credentials.12 In terms of
his writing, Brummer has published numerous law review articles13 and book
chapters14 on international financial regulation. He also is the author of Soft
10. See infra Part II (exploring whether the world is actually experiencing a move to
minilateralism).
11. See infra Part III (exploring future topics that Brummer could explore relating his theories).
12. See Chris Brummer, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/brumm
er-chris.cfm# (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (containing Professor Brummer’s biography).
13. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t),
99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011) [hereinafter Brummer, How International Financial Law Works]; Chris
Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327 (2010); Chris Brummer,Why
Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not Trade, 13 J. INT’LECON. L. 623 (2010); Chris
Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L.
REV. 499 (2010); Chris Brummer,Corporate Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets,
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067 (2008); Chris Brummer, Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods:
A Trade Perspective, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 535 (2008); Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New
Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1435 (2008); Chris Brummer, The Ties That Bind?
Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1349 (2007).
14. See, e.g., Chris Brummer & Rachel Loko, The New Politics of Transatlantic Credit Rating
Agency Regulation, in TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AFTER THE CRISIS 154 (Tony
Porter ed., 2014); Chris Brummer, Networks In(-)Action?: The Transgovernmental Origins of, and
Responses to, the Financial Crisis, in THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL
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Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century, a
book describing the architecture of international financial regulation.15 His
second book,Minilateralism, builds upon some of the insights regarding soft
law and international financial coordination found in his first book by
exploring the broader topic of international economic regulation and charting
themes in this broader area.16
Before going into a deeper theoretical engagement, some basic style
points are worth noting, as well as the basic layout of Minilateralism. The
book is written with a high level of depth and sophistication that makes it a
worthwhile read for an expert in the field of international financial regulation.
It is also an accessible and useful text for someone who may be relatively
new to the field or someone who may have knowledge of some, but not all,
of the wide range of subfields that compose international economic
regulation.
In a very real sense, if you give Brummer two hundred pages, he will
give you the world. This is in part possible because, unlike many law
professors, Brummer spends most of his time in his scholarship describing
how the world is, rather than how the world ought to be.17 This book is no
exception. Brummer’s descriptive style makes the text a valuable resource
for those starting to think about the state of world, although based on his
breadth and depth of knowledge, the reader is at times left wishing that
Brummer would spend more time talking about how international economic
cooperation ought to evolve. He does, however, make a number of very
useful observations throughout the book about how international economic
cooperation should evolve, especially in the conclusion. Notably, as will be
explored in the Part II of this Review, Brummer is relatively aggressive in
reinforcing the idea that minilateralism is new and innovative. Although his
point has merit, especially based upon the examples he offers and the trends
he describes, one should remember that history repeats itself, and the seeds
of minilateralism as the emerging model of international economic regulation
were sown long ago.18
A majority of Brummer’s theories on minilateralism are laid out in the
introduction and chapter five of the text. The remaining chapters of the book
largely provide background material and examples supporting Brummer’s
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL GOVERNANCE 323 (Hassane Cissé, Daniel D.
Bradlow & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2012); Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates
International Finance—and Not Trade, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN FINANCIAL REGULATION AND
MONETARY AFFAIRS 95 (John H. Jackson, Thomas Cottier & Rosa M. Lastra eds., 2012); Chris
Brummer, Examining the Institutional Design of International Investment Law, in APPEALS
MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTDISPUTES 281 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008).
15. CHRISBRUMMER, SOFTLAWAND THEGLOBALFINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULEMAKING IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2012).
16. See generally BRUMMER, supra note 5.
17. See supra notes 13–15 (containing citations to Professor Brummer’s other scholarship).
18. See infra Part II.C (discussing various historical examples of minilateralism).
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thesis that the prevailing model for regulating the global economy is
transitioning from multilateral diplomacy to minilateral diplomacy.
In the introduction, after suggesting that the large, global international
organizations that regulated the global economy in the latter half of last
century have declined in importance in recent years, Brummer argues that
international economic diplomacy is now dominated by regional clubs—such
as the European Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations—and
other more geographically diverse initiatives—such as the G-20, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board.19 In
describing his central thesis, Brummer states,
[c]ore tenets of postwar multilateralism – from big global forums, to formal
rules of the road for economic relations, to U.S. dollar hegemony – are being
supplemented, and in some instances replaced, with alternative mediums
and diplomatic tools in order to respond to a world of more varied interests,
preferences, and power constellations.20
He credits this transition from multilateralism to minilateralism in part to an
aversion to the transaction costs associated with creating and operating large,
global institutions to regulate the global economy.21 Relatedly, he also credits
this transition to the decline of the United States as a hegemon.22 This decline
has resulted in a lack of leadership to push forward global agreements
because a dominant power no longer exists to pacify and overcome the
competing interests of other nations to allow for the creation of such
agreements.23Brummer argues this has fueled a sea of change in international
economic diplomacy from “big” to “small” as a transition from
multilateralism to minilateralism has occurred in recent years.24
As previously discussed, Brummer suggests this new minilateral system
is characterized by three major changes: a shift from global cooperation to
strategic alliances, with the goal of finding the smallest group necessary to
achieve the desired international economic regulation; a turn from formal
treaties to informal nonbinding accords; and the willingness of nations to
resort to financial engineering to achieve their objectives.25 Importantly,
although Brummer notes that others have used the term “minilateralism”
previously, no one has tackled the topic in a single work as it applies to
international economic regulation.26
In chapter one, Brummer explores the rise and fall of multilateralism. He
notes that prior to the mid-seventeenth century, nations rarely cooperated
19. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 1.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. at 3–8.
22. Id. at 14–17.
23. Id. at 8–17.
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id. at 18–19.
26. Id. at 21.
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internationally because of poor communication and the ongoing development
of the modern concept of a “state.”27 As he notes, international economic
cooperation finally began to solidify in regard to monetary policy in the late
1850s and became more and more formalized from that point forward.28
Similarly, as Brummer reports, trade policies also began to formalize in the
late 1800s, although the robustness of the cooperation between states waxed
and waned based on financial crises and global conflicts.29 In the wake of
WorldWar II, the United States became a dominant power and sought greater
multilateral cooperation in international monetary policy and international
trade regulation.30 These efforts led to the Bretton Woods Conference in July
1944 that laid the groundwork for the establishment of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).31 The GATT ultimately resulted in the creation of the World Trade
Organization in 1995 to enforce the GATT and deal with other trade issues.32
As Brummer argues, the post-World War II dominance of the United States
allowed it to fuel the development of the multilateral system, particularly in
the areas of monetary policy and trade, which the United States had special
interests in developing.33 He also suggests that similar multilateral
development did not occur in international financial regulation because the
United States could wait for those seeking capital to come to the United States
to try to obtain access to its world-class financial institutions and capital
markets.34 However, as a result of the United States’ waning dominance in
recent years, Brummer argues that “alternative forums and instruments of
economic cooperation will proliferate away from the traditional multilateral
model [and] . . . a new toolset for economic statecraft is being developed that
attempts to navigate the multipolar world in an orderly way.”35
In chapters two, three, and four of the text, Brummer provides examples
of this emerging minilateral system of international economic regulation,
along with examples of the “new toolset for economic statecraft” that focuses
upon minilateralism.36 In chapter two, Brummer explores minilateralism in
international trade regulation with a focus on the rise in regional and selective
trade agreements.37 In chapter three, he explores minilateralism in
international financial regulation.38 He reports that financial regulators
seeking to regulate international financial markets work through relatively
27. Id. at 22.
28. Id. at 25–32.
29. Id. at 32–38.
30. Id. at 38–39.
31. Id. at 39–40.
32. Id. at 39–44.
33. Id. at 38–39.
34. Id. at 48–49.
35. Id. at 52.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 53–83.
38. See id. at 84–123.
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informal institutions, such as the Basel Committee, Financial Stability Board,
and International Organization of Securities Commissions.39 In the pursuit of
efficient regulation, these regulators tend to use informal and nonbinding
“soft law” (e.g., recommendations regarding best practices, reports and data
analysis, and memorandums of understanding), to achieve international
regulatory goals.40 Although some additional formality has occurred in the
wake of the financial crisis that began in 2008,41 Brummer asserts that
participants in international financial markets adhere to these nonbinding
agreements as a result of reputational concerns and fear of public shaming of
actors that fail to comply with “soft law” international norms.42 Brummer
acknowledges that work is still needed to optimize the regulation of the
international financial system and discusses some of the options that might
be used to achieve this optimization.43 This includes the possible
establishment of an international financial court—which he views to be
unlikely44—and better surveillance reports of financial market participants—
which Brummer views as feasible.45 In chapter four, Brummer explores
minilateralism in the international monetary system.46 Brummer discusses
the waning dominance of the United States dollar,47 regional ties and
challenges created by the Euro,48 and the increasing importance of the
Chinese RMB in Asia and globally.49 Brummer ultimately concludes that
nationalistic tendencies make broad multilateral accords on monetary issues
unlikely, and although the future remains uncertain, minilateral coordination
will probably be the mode of international monetary regulation for the
foreseeable future.50
In chapter five, Brummer deepens his discussion of minilateralism. He
acknowledges, “[t]he challenges facing the global economy are big and
diverse. Not every problem can be tackled the same way, with the same
partners, or with the same commitments or market-related instruments.”51He
then advocates for what he terms “smart minilateralism.”52 He states that
policymakers should go through the following process of determining when
and how to use minilateralism as a tool of international economic regulation:
39. Id. at 85–86.
40. Id. at 92–99.
41. Id. at 105–09.
42. Id. at 112–18.
43. Id. at 118–23.
44. Id. at 120–21.
45. Id. at 122–23.
46. Id. at 124–64.
47. Id. at 127–33.
48. Id. at 133–45.
49. Id. at 149–62.
50. Id. at 164.
51. Id. at 165.
52. Id.
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First, they have to determine their own preferred policy objectives. Next,
they have to identify what tools are possibly available to achieve their
objectives, and the likelihood of success with each. Finally, officials have
to ask whether their actions will be viewed by other relevant actors and
stakeholders as legitimate uses of power.53
In essence, Brummer provides a roadmap for best practices in minilateral
relations.
Brummer is particularly concerned about the legitimacy of
minilateralism because such economic diplomacy in many instances ignores
stakeholder approval, is relatively informal, occurs behind closed doors, and
involves technocrats (i.e., regulators who have been appointed, rather than
elected).54 Within Brummer’s conception of “smart minilateralism,” he
suggests a number of ways to increase the legitimacy of minilateral economic
regulation, including inviting wider participation in the regulatory process,55
allowing citizens of the participating nations to vote on minilateral
initiatives,56 and allowing courts to rule on whether the participating entities
in minilateral activity are acting within their mandates.57 He also notes the
possibility of what he terms “macro level legitimacy,”58 which he believes
can exist because minilateralism often involves numerous entities interacting
and at least some of these entities are controlled by democratic processes.59
He sums up his theory of “smart minilateralism” by stating, “only by teaming
technocratic pragmatism with democratic norms and global aspirations will
today’s economic diplomats enjoy widespread support for their work – and
begin to create a sustainable infrastructure for the twenty-first century
economy.”60
II. A MOVE TO MINILATERALISM?
Brummer gets it right. He tells a compelling story of how the “golden
age” of multilateralism came into being and why that time has passed as a
new age of minilateralism has begun in international economic regulation.
He chiefly credits this transition to an aversion to the transaction costs
associated with creating and operating large, global institutions61 and to the
decline of the United States as a hegemon.62
Various other reasons exist for this transition, and these reasons
strengthen Brummer’s theory. First, during the past few decades, the threat
53. Id.
54. Id. at 169–80.
55. Id. at 180–84, 186–88.
56. Id. at 184–86.
57. Id. at 188–92.
58. Id. at 192. An explanation of Brummer’s definition of legitimacy is provided infra Part III.B.
59. Id. at 192–94.
60. Id. at 198.
61. Id. at 3–8.
62. Id. at 14–17.
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of global war—one of the major animating reasons for creating and operating
multilateral institutions during the twentieth century—has decreased
significantly. Although Brummer flirts with this idea in his text, he does not
emphasize that multilateralism in the twentieth century is inseparably linked
to lessening the threat of global conflict. For example, the League of Nations
was founded as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that ended World War
I as a means of preventing future conflicts.63Additionally, the United Nations
was founded in the wake of World War II for the same reason.64 However,
since the fall of the Soviet Union, the threat of global conflict has been greatly
reduced, and as a result, the perceived need for multilateral organizations as
a means of ensuring global peace and stability has been reduced as well.65
Second, technology has fueled the transition toward minilateralism as the
dominant mode of economic diplomacy. This is because it makes
spontaneous, informal communication possible in ways that were unavailable
during the latter half of last century.66 Although Brummer discusses
technology as fueling globalization,67 he does not emphasize it as fueling the
transition from multilateralism to minilateralism. Just as plants are fueled by
the sun’s light, minilateralism has grown and blossomed in the light of
computer screens, smart phone screens, and various other types of screens
around the globe because these devices make communication and
coordination possible with greater ease and simplicity.
Third, while not emphasized by Brummer, technology is a leading factor
in the decline of formality because it makes large, formal multilateral
institutions seem cumbersome and less useful.68 The formality that
63. See League of Nations Covenant pmbl. (stating that one of the purposes of the League of
Nations was “to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and
security”).
64. SeeU.N. Charter pmbl. (stating that the purpose of the United Nations is “to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war”).
65. See Mamedov Muschwig, Crisis of Transatlantic Relations: NATO and the Future
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), 10 U.MIAMI INT’L&COMP. L. REV. 13, 38 (2002)
(noting “[t]he disappearance of the danger of a nuclear world war between the superpowers and the
fact that the possibility of a comprehensive conventional war between West and East Europe [has]
become inconceivable”).
66. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks
and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’LL. 1, 12 (2002) (“The rise of the telephone, the
jet, the fax and now email and the Internet has progressively made long-distance communication,
and thus networks [and transgovernmental cooperation], far easier and (all else being equal) more
prevalent.”); see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 863 (2006)
(“In the face of advances in communication technologies, the increased ease and decreased cost of
long-distance travel, and the expanded and extended scope of economic and industrial activity,
regulators today face the undeniable reality of a small, small world.”).
67. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 87.
68. See Siddhartha M. Velandy, The Green Arms Race: Reorienting the Discussions on Climate
Change, Energy Policy, and National Security, 3 HARV. NAT’LSEC. J. 309, 339 (2012) (“[I]nformal
network relationships [among nations] have increased in frequency and strength as communications
technology has improved. Peers from across the globe are able to discuss critical areas of mutual
concern outside of the traditional international organizations . . . .”).
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dominated international diplomacy for past centuries has now given way to
simpler, less formal communication among politicians and regulators that has
helped facilitate a transition to minilateralism.69 In sum, as the examples
above show, Brummer’s theory about the emerging dominance of
minilateralism in economic diplomacy is well grounded in fact.
With that said, Brummer is careful to acknowledge that the choice
between minilateralism and multilateralism is not a polar question in which
those seeking to regulate the global economy must choose between one
means of economic diplomacy and the other. As he argues, minilateralism is
part of an “expanded toolset of options for countries navigating a world of
increasingly heterogeneous economic interests and preferences.”70 To put it
differently, in Brummer’s view, minilateralism may be replacing traditional
multilateral economic diplomacy in some instances, although in most
instances, minilateralism is merely supplementing such diplomacy.71
Brummer’s notion that minilateralism is just part of the “toolset” for
economic diplomacy is an important one. For various reasons, attention may
be centered on minilateralism, despite the fact that multilateralism continues
to play a very important role in the regulation of the global economy. Because
Brummer is focused on proving his thesis, he does not spend time discussing
why minilateralism is currently being thrust into the spotlight while the role
of multilateralism remains strong. In the remainder of this Part, the continued
importance of multilateralism will be explored.
A. ENOUGH IS ENOUGH: DOWEHAVEALL THEMULTILATERAL
ORGANIZATIONS THATWENEED?
In 2008, the United States suffered a financial crisis that the U.S.
Department of Treasury referred to as the “most severe financial crisis since
the Great Depression.”72 Many commentators have referred to the event as
the “Great Recession,”73 and some commentators were willing to go so far as
to declare the crisis to be a depression.74 In the wake of the Great Depression
of the 1930s, the United States Congress created a multitude of administrative
69. See id.
70. BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 165.
71. Id. at 3.
72. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 2
(2009), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf (discussing the
financial crisis that began in 2008).
73. But see Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11,
2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology
(“Nobody can take credit for coining the term ‘The Great Recession’ . . . . Why? Because the ‘Great
Recession of 2008’ is not the first recession to be slapped with the lofty title. Every recession of the
last several decades has, at some point or another, received this special designation . . . .”).
74. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE
DESCENT INTODEPRESSION, at x (2009) (“It is the gravity of the economic downturn, the radicalism
of the government’s responses, and the pervading sense of crisis that mark what the economy is
going through as a depression.”).
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agencies to coordinate economic regulation in the United States and to reduce
systemic risk on the national level.75 However, in the wake of the financial
crisis that began in 2008, the government’s response was quite different. In
the voluminous body of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act)76—an act designed to improve
financial stability in the United States and to prevent future financial
crises77—only a handful of new entities (e.g., the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau and the Financial Stability Oversight Council), were
created to coordinate regulation and reduce systemic risk.78 The Dodd-Frank
Act certainly was not the death knell for administrative agencies in the United
States. However, the reason that Congress did not create a new administrative
agency to regulate the mortgage-backed securities that were at the heart of
the financial crisis beginning in 2008 was because the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission already existed and creating a duplicative agency
would have been inefficient and nonsensical. Instead, the Dodd-Frank Act
was about fine-tuning the existing national infrastructure to prevent future
financial crises by reducing systemic risk.
In a very real sense, this phenomenon is also occurring at the
international level, and Brummer’s text can be viewed as a study of this
higher-level fine-tuning. This is not to claim that the patchwork of
international economic regulation is comprehensive and complete. However,
as Brummer’s book details, in the past decade or two, those interested in
regulating the global economy have just focused more on fine-tuning and
filling gaps in this patchwork of international economic regulation. Much of
this fine-tuning and gap filling has occurred through minilateral diplomacy,
while multilateral institutions continue to toil.
Brummer acknowledges, but does not emphasize, this phenomenon in his
text. In his chapter on international finance, after lauding the possibility of an
international financial court to resolve international financial disputes and
stating that creation of such a court is unlikely,79 Brummer writes, “[w]ith so
many practical difficulties [in creating an international financial court], it’s
probably not surprising that regulators have focused on improving those tools
that they already have at their disposal in order to combat systemic risk [in
75. See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV.
499, 503 (2011) (“[I]n response to the Great Depression, Congress created a myriad of new
regulatory and benefit programs and created new administrative agencies to implement them.”).
76. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15
U.S.C.).
77. See id. pmbl. (declaring the Dodd-Frank Act to be designed “[t]o promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system,
to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers
from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”).
78. See generally id.
79. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 118–21.
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the global financial system].”80 Brummer then discusses existing multilateral
entities doing more to monitor international financial activities as a means of
promoting stability in the global financial system.81 Notably, in this same
chapter, Brummer also reports many of the large multilateral institutions and
some minilateral bodies have now created a “vertically integrated system” of
international financial regulation to better address global financial issues.82
As a result, international entities are now working together to coordinate
agenda setting, standard setting, monitoring, and implementation.83 This
demonstrates fine-tuning of multilateral institutions is occurring not only at
the micro level, but at the macro level as well.
As will be explained later, the world definitely does not have all of the
multilateral organizations that we need.84 Brummer, however, is right that the
world has entered an age of minilateralism in which financial regulators are
working with the existing entities and using a new minilateral “toolset” to
fine-tune and fill gaps in international economic regulation. Minilateralism
has definitely not replaced multilateralism in international economic
regulation, but minilateralism certainly has augmented it.
B. BIG BROTHER ISWATCHING AND SO IS EVERYONE ELSE: IS
MINILATERALISM JUST BEING BETTERDOCUMENTED TODAY?
Other reasons exist to question how substantial the shift to minilateralism
really is. Because of the ubiquity of the Internet, the availability of
information today is much different than in the past. The activities of
politicians, regulators, and other bureaucrats are being documented in ways
that they have never been before. Beyond the information that politicians,
regulators, and other bureaucrats want to make available, transparency laws
often require the release of a broad variety of information either by default or
by demand. In the United States, for example, the Freedom of Information
Act of 1966 requires the release of a broad range of information held by the
government upon public request.85 Politicians, regulators, and other
bureaucrats also have to be concerned about the release of information
beyond these willing and unwilling intended disclosures. In the United States,
Edward Snowden provides a prime example of how quickly and easily a
single individual can distribute information a government would prefer to
80. Id. at 121.
81. Id. at 121–22.
82. Id. at 105–09.
83. Id. at 107–08.
84. See infra notes 148–151 and accompanying text (suggesting the need for a multilateral
solution to the regulation of the emerging securities markets through the harmonization and
centralization of international securities regulation and the creation of a global securities regulator).
85. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
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keep classified.86 In short, the availability of information is very different
than it was even a few decades ago.
As a result, one has to consider whether minilateralism is in fact a new
phenomenon, or simply better documented than in the past. The formal global
agreements and institutions that were created in the second half of last
century to regulate the international economy were extraordinarily well
documented because they were both formal and global. In the past, at least
some more informal interactions designed to regulate the global economy
were probably not as well documented. This reality may create the perception
that minilateralism is emerging and coming into vogue with a strength and
force that really it is not.
At the same time, global economic diplomacy exists on a spectrum with
large, formal multilateralism at one end and extraordinarily informal
minilateralism at the other. Even if some minilateralism was not well
documented in the past, a wide range of minilateral economic diplomacy
would have been well documented, if it had been occurring in the past. For
example, Brummer discusses the regional and selective groups that are now
playing a leading role in international economic regulation.87 Even in the pre-
Internet world, one would have a hard time arguing that these types of
minilateral entities would have gone unnoticed and would not have been well
documented. In addition, many of the less formal minilateral agreements,
which Brummer terms “soft law,” likely would have been well documented
as well by historians and the entities impacted by them, if these agreements
were being made. For instance, one example of soft law is the Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation
and the Exchange of Information (MMOU) that was adopted by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in May
2002.88 The MMOU is designed to facilitate cooperation and information
sharing among securities regulators,89 and it is an excellent example of
minilateralism and soft law.90 One would have a hard time arguing that such
a substantial undertaking as this MMOU would have been ignored by
historians prior to the advent of the Internet. In short, while the lack of
documentation of some truly informal types of minilateralism may make
those types of minilateralism appear new, many forms of soft law agreements
86. See James Ball, Edward Snowden NSA Files: Secret Surveillance and Our Revelations So
Far, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/21/ed
ward-snowden-nsa-files-revelations; Pierre Thomas et al., Officials: How Edward Snowden Could
Hurt the U.S., ABCNEWS (June 24, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/0
6/officials-how-edward-snowden-could-hurt-the-u-s/.
87. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 1–2.
88. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
CONCERNING CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf.
89. Id. at 2.
90. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 98 (citing memoranda of understanding among banking and
securities regulators as examples of soft law in international financial regulation).
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would have been well documented in the past, demonstrating Brummer has
identified a substantial and significant shift in how international economic
diplomacy is undertaken.
C. EVERYTHINGOLD ISNEWAGAIN: ISMINILATERALISMREALLY
AN INNOVATION?
In describing the emerging dominant model of minilateral economic
diplomacy, Brummer argues that the old multilateral model is “giving way to
new innovative modes of cooperation, which . . . are aimed at both
liberalizing and supervising the global economy.”91 In a certain regard, this
statement is undoubtedly true because minilateralism is becoming the
dominant mode of economic diplomacy, and because innovation is always
occurring in international economic regulation as a result of the complex and
evolving nature of the international economy. The question of the novelty of
minilateralism, however, is an interesting one. Rather than speaking of the
emergence of minilateralism as the dominant mode of international economic
diplomacy, the better approach might be to refer to the reemergence of
minilateralism. Much of the history that Brummer offers in his text regarding
international economic regulation prior to World War II are examples of
minilateral solutions to international economic problems.92 Brummer even
acknowledges that the post-war dominance of multilateralism was a “rare
historical fluke.”93 As a result, minilateralism is actually the norm, and
multilateralism is the anomaly.
Notably, the roots of many modern nations can be traced to minilateral
economic diplomacy. In his chapter on international monetary regulation,94
Brummer writes extensively about the recent financial crisis in Greece and
its implications for the eurozone.95 Throughout this discussion, Brummer
speaks of Greece as a unified, monolithic nation.96 The territory that is now
occupied by modern Greece, however, was historically governed by city-
states that were originally formed by villages in part for protection and in part
for purposes of normalizing trade.97 Put another way, these city-states are an
early example of the minilateral economic diplomacy at work.
Similarly, the German Confederation, which was created by the Congress
of Vienna in 1815, was a loose association designed to coordinate the defense
91. Id. at 17.
92. See generally id.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id. at 124–64.
95. Id. at 135–36.
96. Id.
97. See generally MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, POLIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANCIENT
GREEK CITY-STATE (2006); LÉOPOLD MIGEOTTE, THE ECONOMY OF THE GREEK CITIES: FROM
THEARCHAIC PERIOD TO THE EARLYROMAN (2009).
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and economies of thirty-nine German-speaking states in central Europe.98
This minilateral effort was a precursor to the modern German state. In
addition, the United States is partially the product of minilateral economic
diplomacy. The Articles of Confederation, a precursor to the modern United
States Constitution, is an example minilateralism at work. The Articles of
Confederation established a confederation of thirteen sovereign states,99 and
the document bound these sovereign states together in part for purposes of
protection and in part to regulate economic activity.100 Although an
aggressive use of the term, even the Constitution of the United States might
be viewed in part as minilateral diplomacy that yielded a nation.101 Major
portions of the Constitution are designed to normalize economic relations
among the previously sovereign states discussed in the Articles of
Confederation.102 The Interstate Commerce Clause, for instance, might be
viewed as an example of minilateral coordination at play.103
One counter-argument to this discussion of modern nations tracing their
roots to minilateral economic diplomacy might be that it misapplies the term
“minilateralism” because minilateralism only applies to efforts intended to
regulate the global economy as a whole. The problem with this argument is
that many of the examples of minilateralism in Brummer’s text are not
intentional efforts to regulate the global economy. For example, the
preferential trade deals Brummer discusses throughout chapter two of his text
as minilateral activity look more like the activities relating to nation building
discussed above, rather than attempts to intentionally regulate the global
economy.104
98. See German Confederation, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBc
hecked/topic/230682/German-Confederation (last visited June 29, 2014).
99. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II [hereinafter ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION] (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United
States, in Congress assembled.”); see also MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION:
AN INTERPRETATIONOF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONALHISTORYOF THEAMERICANREVOLUTION
1744–1781, at 175 (reporting that under the Articles of Confederation “states retained their
sovereign position and the central government was made a subordinate body of severely and strictly
delegated powers”).
100. SeeARTICLES OFCONFEDERATION, supra note 99, art. III (“The said States hereby severally
enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defense, the security of their
liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all
force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty,
trade, or any other pretense whatever.”); id. art. IV (declaring that “the free inhabitants of each of
these States . . . shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce”); id. art. IX, para. 4
(declaring that the established government under the Articles of Confederation “shall also have the
sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own
authority, or by that of the respective States”).
101. See generally U.S. CONST.
102. Id.
103. Id. art. 1, § 8.
104. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 53–83.
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Even after being placed in a historical context, however, Brummer’s
thesis regarding the novelty of minilateral international economic diplomacy
remains a valid and valuable contribution to the existing scholarship for a
variety of reasons. First, a major shift from multilateral economic diplomacy
to minilateral economic diplomacy is occurring and the shift constitutes a
rediscovery of minilateralism. Second, minilateralism is much “bigger” than
it was when it helped to build nations. As Brummer reports, international
economic diplomacy is now dominated by regional clubs (such as the
European Union and Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and more
geographically diverse initiatives (such as the G-20, Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board) that are larger than
most minilateral initiatives in the past.105 Third, the global economy is
constantly growing and evolving and, as a result, new and innovative tools
for regulating it are constantly being developed.
III. A STUDY OF MISSING PUZZLE PIECES AND EMPTY
SPACES ON THE BOOKSHELF
One characteristic of quality scholarship is that it is written with a depth
and sophistication that provides a starting point for future work either by its
author or other scholars. Brummer’s text is no exception. Although the text
is cohesive and thoughtfully written, it discusses a number of topics that
could and should be developed into future articles and books. In this Part, a
small number of these topics will be explored.
A. “MANY-LATERALISMS”
In his text, Brummer reports that minilateral economic diplomacy is more
often supplementing multilateral economic diplomacy, rather than replacing
it.106 As Brummer puts it, minilateral economic diplomacy is part of an
“expanded toolset” in international economic diplomacy and regulation.107
This creates an interesting question: How do these minilateral and
multilateral tools for international economic diplomacy and regulation
interact? If international economic diplomacy and regulation is a story of
international communication and coordination, then to tell the whole story,
one must be able to describe how both forms of diplomacy (i.e., both
minilateral and multilateral) operate independently and describe how they
interact with each other.
In chapter two of his text, in a section entitled “Many-Lateralisms[,]”
Brummer does provide some discussion of how minilateralism and
multilateralism interact along with a discussion of how different minilateral
105. Id. at 1.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 165.
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regimes may interact with each other in the realm of international trade.108
He acknowledges that minilateralism can be a stepping stone to
multilateralism,109 argues that multilateralism is unlikely to provide deep
integration because it is difficult to get broad buy-in for it,110 and discusses
some of the tensions that minilateral diplomacy can create when interacting
with multilateral diplomacy.111 Importantly, Brummer also states, “how trade
minilateralism will be practiced in the future is still very much up for
grabs.”112 The section is well written, and its length is appropriate for a
chapter in which it is included and the text in which it is placed.
Many readers, however, will want to know more about how
minilateralism and multilateralism fit together. This is especially true in
regard to international trade because the area is still “up for grabs” as to how
minilateralism will be practiced in it.113Moreover, Brummer does not discuss
“many-lateralisms” in regard to the international monetary system and
international finance. Based on Brummer’s breadth and depth of knowledge,
this provides fertile ground for future writing.
B. MINILATERALISM ANDMACRO LEVEL LEGITIMACY
As discussed previously,114 Brummer talks extensively about
minilateralism and legitimacy, which he views as an essential component of
the “smart minilateralism” for which he advocates in chapter five of his
text.115 He defines legitimacy as “acceptance of the rulers (and their rules) by
the ruled – an acceptance which usually turns on the degree to which
authority wielded is based upon democratic consent.”116 Based on this
definition, Brummer notes numerous concerns that minilateralism creates,
including in many instances it does not involve stakeholder approval, is
relatively informal, occurs behind closed doors, and often involves
technocrats (i.e., regulators who have been appointed, rather than elected).117
He explores various solutions to these issues, including offering greater
stakeholder participation in minilateral diplomacy,118 requiring stakeholder
approval of minilateral initiatives,119 and allowing courts to rule upon the
legitimacy of minilateral activities and those undertaking them.120 He also
notes that although certain kinds of reforms—like more direct stakeholder
108. Id. at 79–83.
109. Id. at 80.
110. Id. at 80–82.
111. Id. at 82–83.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See supra Part II.
115. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 165–98.
116. Id. at 169–70.
117. Id. at 169–80.
118. Id. at 181–84, 186–88.
119. Id. at 184–86.
120. Id. at 188–92.
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participation—may add to democratic legitimacy, too much participation,
especially in highly technical matters, can damage or threaten economic
stability because, for example, voters may be much less informed than
technocrats.121
In part because of this observation, Brummer makes an interesting point
in a subsection entitled “The Importance of ‘Macro’ Level Legitimacy,”122
that the entire regulatory system must be accounted for when assessing the
legitimacy of multilateral regulation.123 Although he concedes that the
entities operating at the micro-institutional level of many minilateral
initiatives suffer from democratic deficits, he believes that when the
interactions of these institutions are examined at the macro level, the
legitimacy concerns are lessened or disappear because of the
interconnectivity of these organizations.124
The relatively brief length of this subsection is appropriate based on what
Brummer tries to accomplish in his book, but most readers will be left
wanting more of a discussion of macro-level legitimacy and how it plays out
in the three segments of the global economy that Brummer focuses on in the
text (i.e., international trade, international finance, and the international
monetary system). A discussion of how macro-level legitimacy works (and
does not work) in minilateralism would offer an interesting project both for
Brummer and for other scholars.125 Numerous related questions also linger:
How should politicians and regulators undertaking minilateral activities
connect with those who they are serving? Does the proliferation of
minilateral forums increase or reduce legitimacy? What roles does the
increasing availability of information via the Internet and other media play in
minilateral legitimacy? All of these questions provide an excellent basis for
future research and scholarship.
C. THEROLE OFNONGOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES INREGULATING
THEGLOBAL ECONOMY
Brummer’s project is ambitious. As he notes in his introduction, no one
has tackled the topic of minilateralism in a single work as it applies to
international economic regulation. In addition, from a reader’s perspective,
no one has tackled it in such a brief, readable, and comprehensive text. To
achieve such a feat, however, Brummer did have to focus his work on the
minilateral interactions of nations and on the minilateral activities of regional
and selective organizations with strong national support and participation.
121. Id. at 186–92.
122. Id. at 192–94.
123. Id. at 192.
124. Id.
125. Brummer previously authored a law review article on international finance in general with
a similar title. See Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, supra note 13.
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Brummer’s approach leaves open the issue of the role of
nongovernmental entities in minilateralism. Nongovernmental entities often
have a role to play in how nations interact and what courses of action they
pursue in regard to transnational economic issues.126 For example, corruption
is a substantial concern in minilateral international economic regulation.
Even if nations can reach some sort of agreement by way of minilateralism,
this does not mean that the agreement will be effectively implemented and
its mandates properly enforced. If six nations enter into a selective trade
agreement, for instance, bribery of public officials implementing and
enforcing the trade agreement can reduce or eliminate the agreement’s
effectiveness. To ensure the success of these minilateral agreements,
nongovernmental entities are needed to fight against corruption.127 For
instance, Transparency International is one of the leading entities monitoring
and working to fight corruption throughout the world.128 It describes itself as
“politically non-partisan and place[s] great importance on [its]
independence.”129 The organization is currently headquartered in Berlin,
Germany,130 and it operates through more than one hundred chapters located
around the globe, which it describes as “locally established, independent
organisations.”131 Transparency International has played a role in drafting
both minilateral and multilateral anti-corruption agreements (e.g., the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations Convention against
Corruption).132 Transparency International also annually compiles and
publishes the Corruption Perceptions Index (Index), a ranking of countries
based upon perceived levels of public corruption, which is a widely-used
126. See Stephen Kim Park, Talking the Talk and Walking the Walk: Reviving Global Trade and
Development after Doha, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 411 (2013) (“NGOs engage with [nations] in a
wide variety of legally-defined contexts: in the realm of domestic politics, under the auspices of
international organizations, and through various other transnational processes.”); Elad Peled, Should
States Have a Legal Right to Reputation? Applying the Rationales of Defamation Law to the
International Arena, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 107, 137 (2010) (“Nongovernmental organizations . . .
enjoy considerable power in global politics with respect to virtually all issues of international
concern.”).
127. Our Organisation, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organis
ation/mission_vision_and_values (last visited June 16, 2014) (describing Transparency
International as “One global movement sharing one vision: a world in which government, business,
civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption.”).
128. Id.
129. Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
130. Our Organisation: Secretariat, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whow
eare/organisation/secretariat (last visited June 16, 2014).
131. Our Organisation: Our Chapters, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/who
weare/organisation/our_chapters (last visited June 16, 2014).
132. FAQs on Transparency International, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_transparency_international/2/ (last visited June 16, 2014)
(discussing Transparency International’s achievements).
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monitoring tool in the fight against corruption.133 In sum, nongovernmental
entities, like Transparency International, have a substantial role to play in
minilateral diplomacy.
Yet, Brummer’s text does not focus on how nongovernmental entities
interact with minilateral diplomacy among nations, despite the importance of
these entities. This issue provides fertile ground for future scholarship and
also nicely dovetails with the two topics discussed in the previous
subsections: first, a discussion of the “many-lateralisms” at play in
international economic diplomacy and regulation should include a discussion
of how nongovernmental organizations are woven into the complex tapestry
of entities involved in regulating the global economy;134 and second, a
discussion of macro-level legitimacy of minilateral initiatives should include
a discussion of nongovernmental organizations because it provides an
example of another voice that may add to the legitimacy of a minilateral
process.135
IV. THE IMPENDING FAILURE(S) OF MINILATERALISM
In his text, Brummer acknowledges that minilateralism is not a solution
to every problem facing the global economy.136 He declares minilateralism
to be only part of “an expanded toolset of options” for countries attempting
to navigate issues related to international trade, international finance,
international monetary policy, and the myriad of other segments of global
economy.137 As a result, multilateralism still has a role to play. As this
Review notes, the history of modern nation building often contains examples
of minilateralism that have transformed into more formal relationships (i.e.,
nations being born).138 Nations emerged because problems existed that
minilateralism simply could not address. For example, the thirteen sovereign
states that ratified the Articles of Confederation opted to reimagine
themselves as the United States under the Constitution based on concerns that
they were not sufficiently unified for purposes of national defense and to be
economically competitive.139 Put differently, relatively weak minilateralism
133. See Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/res
earch/cpi (last visited June 16, 2014) (describing the Corruption Perceptions Index and providing
links to various versions of it).
134. See supra Part III.A. (discussing how the interplay of the “many-lateralisms” at work in
international economic diplomacy and regulation provides an excellent topic for additional
scholarship).
135. See supra Part III.B. (discussing why macro level legitimacy and how it relates to
minilateralism provides an excellent topic for additional scholarship).
136. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 165.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part II.C (discussing minilateral steps that led to the formation of Germany,
Greece, and the United States).
139. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Condemning Khartoum: The Illinois Divestment Act and Foreign
Relations, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 245, 280 (2006) (“The failure of the Articles of Confederation to
centralize responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs left the fledgling federal government
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failed to achieve a satisfactory result and needed to be replaced by more
substantial minilateral efforts, which resulted in the formation of nations.
Similar failures of minilateralism are certain to occur on the global level as
well when experimentation in regulating the international economic system
does not succeed in achieving desired results.
One recent instance in global economic regulation in which
minilateralism has given way to multilateralism is in the fight against
corruption. Until the 1970s, corruption was largely viewed as a domestic
issue.140 The United States began to change this perception with the
enactment of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA).141 The
FCPA was the first statute in the world prohibiting transnational bribery (i.e.,
bribery of a public official in a foreign country).142 Although the main
justifications for the FCPA were to legalize business ethics and address
foreign policy concerns, the justifications have transitioned, as a result of the
globalization that has occurred during the past few decades, to improving
global economic efficiency, policing the international economy, and
promoting the rule of law.143 During the 1990s and early 2000s, selective and
regional treaties were created as countries searched for minilateral solutions
to concerns about corruption.144 Because these minilateral efforts were
viewed as insufficient, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
subject to a multiplicity of state regulation which strangled commerce, promoted interstate
animosity, and threatened to embroil the country in conflicts with foreign powers.”); Samuel
Issacharoff, Getting Beyond Kansas, 74 UMKC L. REV. 613, 613 (2006) (“The familiar refrain on
the failings of the Articles of Confederation informs that a centralizing national authority was
required for spreading the burdens of taxation, ensuring the internal instrumentalities of commerce,
policing the borders and national security of the entire nation, and conducting the foreign affairs of
a unified national power.”).
140. See Eric C. Chaffee, From Legalized Business Ethics to International Trade Regulation: The
Role of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Transnational Anti-Bribery Regulations in
Fighting Corruption in the International Trade, 65 MERCER L. REV. 701, 709–13 (2014)
(discussing the origins of the FCPA and the realization that corruption might be a transnational
problem).
141. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(2012)).
142. See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation
as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 353 (2010) (reporting that
the FCPA was the “first statute of its kind” when it was enacted).
143. See generally Chaffee, supra note 140.
144. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 105-39, 35 I.L.M. 724; Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the
European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, May 26, 1997, S.
TREATYDOC. NO. 109-6 (2003), 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1; Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-
43 (2005), 37 I.L.M 1; Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999,
E.T.S. No. 173; Council of Europe, Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, E.T.S. No.
174; Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption
(ECOWAS), Dec. 21, 2001 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial &
Commercial Law); African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5.
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United Nations Convention Against Corruption on October 31, 2003.145 As
of the writing of this Review, the Convention had one hundred forty
signatories and one hundred seventy-eight parties,146 which means it should
fall within Brummer’s relatively narrow definition of “multilateralism.”147
Another area in which multilateral coordination is likely to occur is in
the regulation of securities. The globalization of capital markets that has
occurred over the past few decades has created new forms of systemic risk.
Patchwork regulation has traditionally not worked in the area of securities
regulation, which is evidenced by the fact that every developed nation in the
world (with the exception of Canada) has transitioned to a national system of
securities regulation.148 The United States, for example, began with a system
that governed its capital markets under general contract, tort, and criminal
law; moved to state regulation in the form of Blue Sky Laws; and is currently
governed by federal securities laws.149 National securities regulators are
unlikely to quickly denounce their nationalistic and protectionist tendencies
and opt for a multilateral solution to regulating global capital markets through
the harmonization and centralization of international securities regulation and
the creation of a global securities regulator.150 However, as future financial
crises occur, greater coordination is likely to occur and incremental progress
145. UnitedNations ConventionAgainst Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349U.N.T.S. 41; see alsoG.A.
Res. 58/4, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, paras. 2–3 (Oct. 31, 2003) (adopting the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption).
146. See United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of
1 December 2015, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS& CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CA
C/signatories.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (providing a complete list of signatories and parties
to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption).
147. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of “multilateralism” that
Brummer uses within his text.
148. But see Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-
Based Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411,
1485 (2007) (“Current forces are strongly in favor of moving Canada from its existing fragmented
structure to a federal system with a single national securities regulator.”).
149. See Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An Evolutionary Model for the
Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 587,
614 (2010) (“The failure of the states to provide stability to the national securities markets led to
the centralization of securities regulation in the United States through the enactment of the Securities
Act of 1933, the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the creation of the SEC.”);
Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Validity of the
Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 851 (2009)
(“Prior to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, individual states were the main forces in
regulating securities. The state statutes were and are commonly referred to as ‘blue sky laws,’ and
prior to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the state statutes created an inconsistent patchwork
of securities regulation that was largely ineffective in preventing fraud.”).
150. See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 191, 205 (2008) (“Even in the face of crisis and scandal, we will not see a global
securities and financial services regulator . . . anytime soon. But we may well see joint task forces
wherein regulatory personnel from various countries are detailed to a central location to coordinate
enforcement efforts aimed at some kind of threat, and if that becomes routine, there will be further
small steps toward a permanent regulatory institution, until it already exists de facto and is less
threatening politically.”).
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is likely to be made from the minilateral to multilateral because crisis tends
to fuel regulatory innovation.151
Brummer notes in his text that minilateralism is not good or bad,152 and
future decades hold the promise of seeing when minilateralism works and
when it does not. Brummer focuses on the “present” in his work, but it is
important to remember that these failures are coming, and they will offer an
opportunity to reassess and reimagine minilateralism.
CONCLUSION
As discussed at the beginning of this Review, international economic
regulation confounds Ockham’s razor. First, the problems that need to be
addressed have not been clearly identified because the goals trying to be
achieved have not been sufficiently determined. Second, because of the
recent dramatic acceleration of globalization, what might be the simplest
solution to the problems that have been identified have yet to be determined.
Brummer’s text is an excellent addition to the work occurring to address how
to regulate the international economic system.Whether simple solutions exist
in international economic regulation is an interesting question, and whether
the simplest answer will ultimately be the best answer is presently impossible
to determine. What is clear, however, is that international economic
regulation promises to evolve in new and exciting ways.
151. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S.
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31, 51 (2007) (“The history of
financial legislation, from the Bubble Act of 1720 to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, shows that it
is usually the child of crisis.”).
152. See BRUMMER, supra note 5, at 165.
